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Home  sharing  platforms  have  been  creating  a  disturbance  to  existing  rules  and  
balances  in  rental  housing  market  by  expanding  the  use  of  traditional  rental  apartments  
as  places  for  tourist,  by  facilitating  the  conversion  of  long-­term  apartment  to  short-­term  
rentals,  and  by  providing  the  way  for  landlords  to  capture  full  market  values  with  their  
properties.  The  alternation  of  dynamics  among  stakeholders  in  rental  housing  market  
triggered  a  huge  debate.  In  determining  whether  a  home  sharing  platform  affecting  on  
the  rental  housing  market  in  New  York  City,  this  paper  tested  if  Airbnb  units  take  rental  
units  off,  increase  rents,  exacerbate  rent  burdens  on  renter  population,  and  cause  renter  
evictions  by  using  difference-­in-­differences  methodology  which  looks  at  values  in  two  
different  neighborhood  groups  in  two  different  time  periods.  The  result  showed  that  the  
home  sharing  platform  did  not  have  significant  influence  upon  New  York  City’s  rental  
housing  affordability  nor  showed  any  evidence  of  causing  renter  evictions.  Even  though  
numbers  do  not  support  the  existing  arguments,  things  can  be  interpreted  differently  by  
adding  different  contexts  in  the  housing  market.  The  number  of  Airbnb  units  and  
duration  of  the  Airbnb  effect  may  not  be  yet  reached  to  the  point  where  it  starts  to  effect  
on  rental  housing  market  and  cancels  out  other  factors  that  effects  on  the  market.  








2.1.  Rental  Housing  Market  in  New  York  City 
2.2.  Home  Sharing 
2.3.  Supporters  and  Critics 
 
3.  LITERATURE  REVIEW 
3.1.  Rent  Increase 
3.2.  Renter  Evictions 
3.3.  Distinguishing  Casual  and  Commercial  Listings 
 
4.  AIRBNB  SHORT-­TERM  RENTALS  IN  NEW  YORK  CITY 
4.1.  Airbnb  Units  for  the  Study 
4.2.  Number  is  Increasing 
4.3.  In  Lower  Manhattan  and  Northern  Brooklyn 
4.4.  Mostly  1  Bedroom  Apartments 
4.5.  Incentive  Exists 
 
5.  RESEARCH  DESIGN 





6.1.  Median  Gross  Rent 
6.2.  Rent  in  Percentage  of  Household  Income 
6.3.  Renter  Occupancy  Rate 
6.4.  Rental  Vacancy  Rate 
 











New  York  City  has  about  8  million  residents  and  the  majority  of  those  are  renting  their  
homes  rather  than  owning  one.  As  such,  fluctuations  in  the  rental  housing  market  may  
impinge  on  68  percent  of  the  population  in  the  city.  The  rental  housing  landscape  in  
New  York  City  is  extremely  tight.  Demand  for  rental  housing  has  surpassed  its  supply  
and  this  is  reflected  in  the  city-­wide  low  rental  vacancy  rate.  Since  housing  is  a  
necessity  and  comprises  a  substantial  amount  of  renter  household’s  income,  the  state  
government  has  enacted  rent  stabilization  measures  and  capped  rent  increases  on  
certain  types  of  housing  to  protect  its  renter  population.  Amidst  the  market’s  mismatch  
of  supply  and  demand,  the  introduction  of  home-­sharing  platforms  have  disrupted  the  
already-­tight  rental  market.  Concerns  have  been  raised  that  short-­term  rental  platforms  
provide  a  loophole  for  homeowners  to  opt  out  of  rent  stabilization  and  earn  full  market-­
rate  rents,  thereby  removing  housing  units  from  the  traditional  rental  apartment  
inventory.  If  true,  such  behavior  would  hinder  the  ability  of  affordable  housing  programs  
to  operate  as  designed.  These  effects  have  not  been  verified  clearly.  This  paper  








2.1. RENTAL HOUSING MARKET IN NEW YORK CITY 
 
RENTAL  HOUSING  DEMAND 
 
Most  New  Yorkers  live  in  rental  housing,  so  the  city’s  housing  stock  is  largely  renter-­
occupied.  According  to  the  2014  American  Community  Survey,  New  York  City  had  a  
total  of  3,407,932  housing  units,  and  renter  occupied  units  comprised  68  percent  of  
available  housing  stock,  which  counted  as  2,107,128  and  owner  units  numbered  
1,033,226  or  30  percent  of  the  housing  stock  (American  Community  Survey,  2014).  
New  York  City  has  had  more  renters  than  homeowners  for  the  last  decade,  with  renters  
comprising  between  66  and  69  percent  of  the  population  from  2006  to  2014.  This  is  
significantly  higher  than  the  United  States  average  of  around  36  percent  during  the  
same  period.   
 
While  the  majority  of  New  York’s  population  is  living  in  rental  housing,  renting  an  
apartment  in  New  York  City  can  be  difficult  to  afford.  In  2014,  the  city’s  median  gross  
rent  was  $1,234,  about  $300  more  than  the  median  gross  rent  at  the  national  level.  
About  15  percent  of  the  City’s  rental  units  had  a  gross  rent  of  less  than  $800,  while  46  
percent  had  a  gross  rent  in  the  $800  and  $1,499  range.  39  percent  of  rental  units  cost  
more  than  $1,500  per  month  (Housing  and  Vacancy  Survey,  2014).  In  inflation  adjusted  
terms,  the  median  gross  rent  rose  by  4.3  percent  from  2011  to  2014.  Because  many  
	  	  
5  
renters  live  in  rent-­stabilized  apartments,  receive  rent  subsidies,  or  pay  lower  rates  as  a  
result  of  long-­term  tenancy,  the  median  gross  rent  paid  by  all  renters  does  not  
accurately  reflect  the  current  landscape  for  new  rental  unit  seekers  in  the  city  (New  York  
City  Rent  Guidelines  Board,  2015).  The  median  asking  rent  of  apartments  advertised  for  
rent  on  StreetEasy  in  2013  was  $2,900—more  than  double  the  median  rent  paid  by  all  
New  Yorkers.   
 
Looking  at  median  household  income  helps  us  to  see  population’s  purchasing  power  for  
rental  housing.  The  median  renter  income  in  2014  was  $41,060.  Applying  the  30  
percent  of  income  threshold,  units  have  to  be  below  $1,026  to  be  affordable  for  
households  earning  the  median  renter  income.  The  actual  median  gross  rent  in  2014  
was  $1,234,  about  $200  more  than  the  affordability  threshold  (Housing  and  Vacancy  
Survey,  2013).  From  2006  to  2014,  rent  increases  far  outpaced  income  growth,  with  
median  rent  increasing  by  12  percent  while  median  renter  income  increasing  by  only  2.3  
percent.  Rental  prices  surged  while  median  renter  income  remained  stagnant. 
 
Rental  housing  demand  is  usually  measured  by  vacancy  rate,  and  New  York  City’s  
vacancy  rate  has  always  remained  very  low.  As  of  2014,  3.9  percent  of  rental  units  were  
vacant.  With  little  exception  it  has  been  below  4  percent  from  2005  to  2014,  well  below  
the  5  percent  threshold  required  for  rent  regulation  under  New  York  State  law.  As  of  
2014,  the  rental  vacancy  rate  in  Manhattan  was  found  to  be  4.07  percent.  The  Vacancy  
rate  in  the  Bronx  was  3.77  percent,  while  in  Brooklyn  it  was  3.06  percent.  In  Queens  the  
rental  vacancy  rate  was  only  2.69  percent  (Housing  and  Vacancy  Survey,  2014).  The  
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rental  vacancy  rate  translated  into  the  availability  of  just  81,632  vacant  units  out  of  2.1  
million  rental  units  in  the  city.   
   
RENTAL  HOUSING  SUPPLY 
 
While  demand  for  rental  units  is  very  high,  New  York’s  rental  stock  has  grown  more  
slowly  than  that  of  other  major  cities  in  the  United  States  (NYU  Furman  Center,  2015).  
In  the  9  years  between  2006  and  2014,  the  number  of  rental  housing  units  in  New  York  
increased  by  5.5  percent.  During  the  same  period,  the  number  of  homeowner  units  
decreased  by  nearly  as  much—5.3  percent—implying  that  conversions  from  owner-­
occupied  units,  rather  than  new  construction,  might  account  for  much  of  the  increase  in  
rental  units.   
 
The  number  of  permits  issued  for  new  housing  construction  reflects  the  new  dwelling  
units  that  will  be  completed  and  ready  for  occupancy  in  the  near  future.  The  number  of  
permits  issued  by  the  city  has  increased  since  their  dramatic  recession  in  2009,  but  
have  not  yet  returned  to  the  pre-­recession  levels  of  2008.  In  2014,  permits  were  issued  
for  20,483  new  housing  units,  a  14  percent  increase  from  the  17,995  units  in  2013.  
Despite  five  years  of  consecutive  increases,  permit  levels  are  still  more  than  13,000  
units  lower  than  the  2008  peak  of  33,500  (U.S.  Census  Bureau).  Almost  91  percent  of  
all  permits  in  2014  were  for  units  in  five-­family  or  greater  buildings.  Such  multi-­family  
buildings  contain  45  units  on  average  for  the  city  as  a  whole,  and  80  units  on  average  in  
Manhattan.  In  2014,  11,867  new  housing  units  actually  entered  the  rental  housing  
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market  (New  York  City  Department  of  City  Planning,  2015).  The  addition  of  these  units  




New  York  City  has  attempted  to  regulate  rent  prices  through  various  measures,  
including  rent  stabilization,  which  is  unusual  in  the  United  States.  Rent  Stabilization  is  a  
New  York  State  law  that  restricts  how  much  rent  for  certain  residential  housing  units  can  
increase  annually.  The  law  applies  to  buildings  constructed  before  1974  that  have  six  or  
more  units.  Rent  stabilization  was  adopted  to  protect  renters  from  abrupt  increase  in  
rents  and  to  protect  their  right  to  renew  their  leases.  In  2011,  about  1  million  units—
roughly  45  percent—of  New  York  City’s  rental  housing  stock  were  rent  stabilized.  By  
2014,  there  were  slightly  more  than  1  million  rent-­stabilized  units,  comprising  47  percent  
of  the  rental  stock  (Housing  Vacancy  Survey,  2014).  About  30  percent  of  rent  stabilized  
units  were  located  in  Brooklyn,  28  percent  in  Manhattan,  23  percent  in  the  Bronx,  19  
percent  in  Queens,  and  less  than  1  percent  in  Staten  Island  (NYU  Furman  Center,  
2014).     
 
2.2. HOME SHARING 
 
SHARING  ECONOMY  AND  HOME  SHARING 
 
While  demand  for  housing  already  far  outpaces  supply  and  the  city  government  fighting  
to  make  rental  units  more  affordable,  the  new  platforms  for  home-­sharing  have  further  
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complicated  the  rental  market.  Home-­sharing  platforms  have  expanded  the  use  of  rental  
apartments  as  temporary  lodging  for  tourists.  The  search  technologies  used  by  such  
platforms  have  made  it  easier  for  unit  providers  and  unit  seekers  to  connect,  simplifying  
the  allocation  and  capitalization  of  an  otherwise  idle  asset  (Sundararajan,  2015).  As  a  
result,  more  lucrative  options  are  now  within  reach  for  providers  of  rent  stabilized  
housing  units.  Converting  long-­term  rentals  into  short-­term  rentals  enables  landlords  to  
capture  full-­market  rent  rates  from  less  price  sensitive  tourists  who  are  generally  willing  
to  pay  more  for  a  for  short  period  of  time.  The  spoils  of  the  home  sharing  economy  go  
solely  to  its  participants,  while  non-­participants  are  left  to  suffer  its  negative  effects  on  




This  paper  specifically  focuses  on  Airbnb.  There  have  been  many  companies  facilitating  
short-­term  housing  rentals  before  Airbnb  entered  the  market.  However,  since  its  
founding  in  2008,  Airbnb  has  quickly  grown  to  become  the  most  dominant  player  in  the  
industry,  with  over  1  million  listings  in  34,000  cities  and  190  countries  worldwide  
(Airbnb).  Airbnb  was  introduced  in  New  York  City  in  2009,  and  as  of  February  2016,  the  
total  number  of  listings  in  the  city  was  nearly  36,000.    
 
Airbnb  provides  a  digital  digital  platform  that  facilitates  the  exchange  of  short-­term  
housing  between  hosts  and  guests.  Hosts  can  be  property  owners,  leaseholders,  or  a  
management  company  working  on  behalf  of  the  property  owner.  Hosts  can  list  three  
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different  types  of  units  on  Airbnb:  entire  homes,  private  rooms,  and  shared  rooms.  For  
an  entire  home  or  apartment,  the  guest  is  renting  the  entire  space,  and  the  host  is  not  
present  in  the  unit.  For  private  room  rentals,  the  guest  is  using  a  room  with  some  
degree  of  privacy  within  a  host’s  home  or  apartment.  The  host  is  present  in  the  unit  
during  the  stay.  For  shared  rooms,  the  guest  is  using  the  same  living  space  as  the  host.  
Airbnb  generates  revenue  by  charging  hosts  a  three  percent  commission  and  by  
charging  guests  a  six  to  twelve  percent  commission,  thus  generating  a  nine  to  fifteen  
percent  commission  for  every  booking.    
 
Positively  reframing  perceptions  about  participating  in  the  home  sharing  economy  has  
been  critical  to  Airbnb’s  explosive  growth.  The  rating  and  review  systems  they  provide  
enable  hosts  and  guests  to  publicly  share  information  about  one  another,  which  allows  
for  some  degree  of  screening  to  take  place,  and  helps  to  build  trust  between  
participants  and  the  service  itself  (Lewyn,  2015).   
  
2.3. SUPPORTERS AND CRITICS OF AIRBNB 
 
Short-­term  rentals  provide  new  supplemental  income  for  hosts.  Renting  out  spaces  can  
drive  up  the  host’s  ability  to  afford  housing  costs.  Moreover,  expanded  purchasing  
power  can  provide  hosts  with  more  housing  options  and  increase  their  ability  to  move  to  
better  rental  housing.  A  survey  of  344  hosts  conducted  by  Airbnb  found  that  56  percent  
of  hosts  did  in  fact  use  income  from  rentals  listed  on  the  service  to  pay  for  part  of  their  
rent  or  mortgage.  Other  supporters  of  short-­term  rentals  have  said  that  their  hosting  
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business  allows  them  to  afford  the  cost  of  living  expenses  in  New  York  City  (Sperling,  
2015).  A  2013  survey  by  Rosen  Consulting  Group  found  that  42  percent  of  Airbnb  users  
reported  using  short-­term  rental  income  to  supplement  living  expenses.  However,  it  is  
rather  difficult  to  evaluate  to  what  degree  extra  income  from  home  sharing  supports  
housing  costs.   
 
On  the  other  hand,  some  argue  that  short-­term  rentals  exacerbate  the  city’s  already-­
acute  housing  shortage  by  offering  more  profitable  alternatives  to  the  traditional  long-­
term  housing  market.  Short-­term  rental  platforms  may  deprive  renter  populations  of  
available  rental  housing  and  encourage  landlords  to  evict  current  tenants.  The  most  
common  argument  against  Airbnb  is  that  making  short-­term  lodging  more  approachable  
reduces  the  supply  of  apartments  that  are  usually  leased  for  a  month  or  more  at  a  time.  
The  argument  continues  that  units  listed  on  Airbnb  for  a  few  days  at  a  time  would,  in  the  
absence  of  Airbnb,  be  rented  out  as  traditional  apartments.  Therefore,  Airbnb  reduces  
the  housing  supply  and  raises  rents.  However,  it  is  also  difficult  to  determine  if  units  that  
are  currently  rented  out  using  Airbnb  used  to  be  long-­term  rental  housing  or  merely  
vacant  units  used  for  recreational  or  other  purposes  before.   
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 




Some  of  the  prime  neighborhoods  in  New  York  City  have  several  hundred  Airbnb  
rentals.  While  a  few  hundred  units  may  not  sound  like  much,  it  is  enough  to  significantly  
impact  neighborhood  rent  prices.  A  quantifiable  relationship  has  been  identified  
between  changes  in  total  rental  inventory  and  changes  in  neighborhood  rental  costs  
(Ellen,  2015).  In  New  York,  for  every  0.5  percent  that  rental  supply  contracts,  rent  rises  
by  1  percent.  If  a  rental  market  consists  of  1,000  units  with  a  median  price  of  $1,000  per  
month,  removing  50  of  those  units  increases  median  rent  in  that  market  by  $100,  to  
$1,100  on  average. 
 
The  study  exemplified  the  Airbnb  units  in  Williamsburg  and  Greenpoint.  In  2015,  Airbnb  
units  represented  around  0.6  to  1.15  percent  of  the  total  rental  housing  stock  in  these  
neighborhoods  respectively.  Removing  that  percentage  of  units  elevates  median  rent  by  
around  1.2  and  2.3  percent.  Based  on  the  claim  of  this  study,  if  those  units  were  instead  
listed  on  the  long-­term  rental  market,  neighborhood  monthly  median  asking  rent,  
$3,055,  according  to  StreetEasy,  would  be  around  $35  and  $69  lower,  respectively.  
However,  this  study  connects  the  supply  of  rental  housing  with  rent  increases  rather  too  
directly  without  any  controls.   
 
Airbnb   rentals   slightly   drive   up   rents   in   some   prime   neighborhoods   in   major   cities  
(Davidoff,  2015).  It  was  mentioned  that  Airbnb  “increase[s]  the  price  of  a  one-­bedroom  
unit  by  about  $6  a  month.”  Specifically,  in  San  Francisco,  it  “increase[s]  rent  by  on  average  
about  $19  a  month.”  To  come  up  with  this  estimates,  he  did  not  take  into  account  units  
that  locals  can  still  live  in  long-­term.  With  the  assumption  that  all  listings  are  renting  out  
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solely   on  Airbnb,   in  New  York,   rent  would  go  up  around  $24  a  month.   Importance  of  
dividing  listings  by  possibility  of  being  used  as  a  long-­term  rentals  or  solely  as  short-­term  
rentals.   
 
According  to  his  findings,  listings  are  not  evenly  distributed  and  tend  to  be  clustered  in  
prime  neighborhoods.  This  implies  that  popular  neighborhoods  attract  more  Airbnb  
rentals  and  this  causes  more  pressure  on  rents  in  such  neighborhoods.  Airbnb  is  less  
an  issue  of  citywide  affordability  than  it  is  of  people’s  right  to  stay  in  desirable  
neighborhoods.  Thus  Airbnb  is  affecting  housing  affordability  in  New  York  City’s  most  
desirable  neighborhoods,  not  throughout  the  city.  This  paper  hopes  to  evaluate  this  
claim  by  looking  at  gross  rents  before  and  after  the  emergence  of  Airbnb. 
 
3.2. RENTER EVICTIONS 
 
LAANE,  a  union-­affiliated  policy  organization  based  in  Los  Angeles,  issued  a  report  in  
2015  claiming  that  Airbnb  removes  7,316  units  from  the  Los  Angeles  rental  market.  This  
“is  equivalent  to  seven  years  of  affordable  housing  construction  in  Los  Angeles”  
(Samaan,  2015).  Considering  that  Los  Angeles  provides  little  in  terms  of  affordable  
housing,  this  argument  might  not  be  very  meaningful.  The  report  also  pointed  out  that  
Airbnb  creates  incentives  to  take  units  off  the  rental  market.  The  study  exemplified  the  
Morrison  Apartments  in  Venice  Beach,  a  complex  with  21  units  covered  by  the  City  of  
Los  Angeles  Rent  Stabilization  Ordinances.  Coldwell  Banker  Commercial  (CBC)  listed  
the  Morrison  for  sale  and  suggested  converting  the  Morrison  to  Airbnb  rentals  as  the  
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prudent  financial  choice  for  its  future  owners.  CBC  estimated  that  a  landlord  could  earn  
about  $200,000  in  annual  income  by  renting  the  rent-­controlled  units  out  on  the  market.  
Converting  the  building  to  Airbnb  units  could  bring  more  than  $477,000  per  year,  
assuming  the  2014  United  States  hotel  occupancy  rate  of  67  percent.  LAANE  showed  
concern  that  this  new  potential  income  stream  may  stimulate  rental  unit  conversions.   
 
Moreover,  according  to  the  report  prepared  by  San  Francisco  Budget  and  Legislative  
Analyst,  approximately  71.9  percent  of  San  Francisco’s  rental  stock  is  rent  stabilized  
below  market  rate.  Rental  rates  in  San  Francisco  have  been  increasing  so  rapidly  over  
the  past  few  years  that  some  landlords  have  been  inclined  to  evict  their  tenants  to  
capture  full  market  value.  The  report  continues  that  Airbnb  creates  additional  incentives  
for  the  higher  revenue  for  landlords.  The  San  Francisco  Rent  Board  reported  that  
notices  of  eviction  increased  from  2,039  to  2,789—or  37  percent—between  2011  and  
2014.  The  Rent  Board  did  not  track  what  happened  to  units  after  evictions  occurred,  so  
it  is  difficult  to  determine  how  many  evictions  resulted  in  housing  units  being  converted  
to  short-­term  rentals.    
 
3.3. DISTINGUISHING CASUAL AND COMMERCIAL LISTINGS 
 
The  City  and  County  of  San  Francisco  conducted  the  impact  of  Airbnb  by  creating  three  
scenarios  based  on  the  severity  of  its  impact  on  rental  housing  market  (San  Francisco  
Budget  and  Legislative  Analyst's’  Office,  2015).  Estimates  of  these  three  scenarios  are  
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prepared  using  different  assumptions  about  bookings  and  the  thresholds  that  
distinguishes  causal  and  commercial  short-­term  rentals.   
 
Casual  hosts  are  defined  as  those  who  occasionally  make  their  place  available  for  
short-­term  rentals  for  extra  income.  In  the  case  of  renting  a  room  where  they  live,  casual  
hosts  would  not  need  or  choose  to  have  a  roommate.  The  Budget  and  Legislative  
Analyst  concluded  that  casual  hosts  are  assumed  not  to  be  affecting  the  rental  housing  
market  because  they  would  continue  to  live  in  their  apartment  in  the  absence  of  the  
short-­term  rental  market.   
 
Commercial  hosts  are  defined  as  those  who  do  not  live  in  their  unit  and  rent  it  out  as  a  
means  of  generating  income.  The  report  says  that  in  the  absence  of  the  short-­term  
rental  market,  they  would  be  living  in  the  unit  themselves,  placing  the  unit  on  the  long-­
term  rental  market,  or  getting  roommates.  The  Budget  and  Legislative  Analyst  
concluded  that  commercial  hosts  are  assumed  to  be  removing  rental  housing  units  that  
would  otherwise  be  available  for  the  long-­term  rental  market.   
 
Three  scenarios  were  developed  with  variations  in  assumptions.  The  medium  impact  
scenario  was  the  primary  scenario  and  presented  as  the  main  analysis  in  the  report.  
This  scenario  applied  a  threshold  of  90  days  or  more  for  commercial  hosts.  While  all  
scenarios  showed  an  impact  on  the  rental  housing  market,  especially  in  certain  




4. AIRBNB SHORT-­TERM RENTALS IN NEW YORK CITY  
 
4.1. AIRBNB UNITS FOR THE STUDY 
 
In  this  study,  Airbnb  units  that  are  listed  as  an  entire  apartment  with  high  availability  are  
considered  to  have  impact  on  the  rental  housing  market  because  they  have  a  greater  
chance  of  displacing  renter  housing  units.  High  availability  in  this  paper  will  be  defined  
as  90  days  or  more  per  year,  the  most  conservative  approach  in  the  City  and  County  of  
San  Francisco  study.  Airbnb  units  that  are  listed  as  entire  apartments  with  availability  of  
more  than  90  days  per  year  are  assumed  to  be  removing  housing  units  otherwise  




As  of  February  2016,  there  were  35,957  Airbnb  rentals  listed  in  New  York  City.  Of  
those,  53.6  percent  were  listed  as  an  entire  apartment,  and  43.4  percent  were  listed  as  
private  units.  More  than  60  percent  of  the  total  Airbnb  listings  in  the  city  are  rented  out  
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more  than  90  days  per  year,  and  more  than  30  percent  were  rented  out  for  more  than  3  
months  per  year.   
 




The  number  of  Airbnb  listings  has  increased  gradually  since  2009.  As  of  February  2016,  
the  inventory  is  almost  equivalent  to  the  number  of  rental  units  supplied  from  new  
constructions  in  2013  and  2014  combined.  The  share  of  short-­term  rentals  that  are  
listed  as  entire  units  and  rented  more  than  90  days  a  year  was  10,818,  which  is  30  
percent  of  all  Airbnb  units.  The  share  was  around  38  percent  up  until  2010.  It  has  been  
slowly  decreasing  as  years  go  by  and  in  2015,  it  was  around  30  percent  of  total  listings.  
Surely  Airbnb  units  have  been  increasing  in  numbers,  the  growth  rate  has  been  
decreasing  over  time.  From  2009  to  2011,  the  number  increased  by  10  times,  from  2011  
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to  2013,  the  number  increased  by  3  times,  and  from  2013  to  2015,  number  increased  by  
70  percent.  Within  7  years,  it  has  reached  to  10,181  units  by  February  2016.  This  takes  
up  0.5  percent  of  the  total  rental  housing  stock  in  New  York  City.  For  now,  portion  that  
short-­term  rental  takes  up  from  traditional  apartment  unit  seems  quite  small.  The  
number  is  increasing  but  the  pace  is  getting  slower.     
 




Entire  unit  Airbnb  rental  properties  are  highly  concentrated  in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn.  
Out  of  10,818  study  units,  Manhattan  accounted  for  6,340  Airbnb  units,  which  is  58.6  
percent,  and  Brooklyn  accounted  for  3,663  units,  which  is  33.86  percent.  Together,  
10,003  out  of  10,818  units  located  in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn  and  this  is  over  90  
percent  of  total  number  of  listings.  Among  neighborhoods  in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn,  it  
is  apparent  that  most  of  the  Airbnb  units  are  clustered  in  neighborhoods  in  lower  
Manhattan  and  the  northern  part  of  Brooklyn.   
	  	  
18  











Out  of  all  195  neighborhoods,  there  are  five  neighborhoods  in  New  York  with  over  500  
Airbnb  short-­term  rental  units.  The  West  Village  contains  more  than  600  Airbnb  units.  
North  Side  -­  South  Side  is  the  only  neighborhood  located  in  Brooklyn  on  the  list.  Due  to  
its  relatively  smaller  rental  housing  stock,  the  proportion  of  Airbnb  units  to  total  rental  
housing  stocks  were  highest  among  neighborhoods  over  500  or  more  short-­term  
rentals.  Hudson  Yards  -­  Chelsea  -­  Flatiron  -­  Union  Square,  East  Village,  and  Clinton,  
neighborhoods  that  are  located  in  mid-­  and  lower  Manhattan  had  over  500  Airbnb  units  
in  the  neighborhood.  Units  that  are  located  in  these  five  areas  takes  up  25  percent  of  











The  most  prominent  type  of  short-­term  rental  was  multi-­family  residential  in  the  form  of  
apartments.  9,690  out  of  10,818  units  were  located  in  apartments,  accounting  for  nearly  
90  percent  of  the  total  number  of  listings.  Multi-­family  housing  tends  to  have  higher  renter  
share  than  other  types.  Moreover,  it  is  illegal  to  rent  multi-­family  homes  for  less  than  30  
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days  while  the  owner  is  not  present  in  the  unit  by  the  state  law.  Considering  this,  most  of  
the  study  units  are  outlawed.  Over  the  half  of  the  listings  were  with  1  bedroom.  Combined  
with   studio   and   2   bedrooms,   it   takes   up   more   than   90   percent   of   the   total   listings.  
Considering  that  most  newly  built  residential  buildings  in  New  York  City  are  multi-­family,  
with  45  units  on  average,  new  supply  of  rental  housing  has  higher  probability  to  be  taken  
off  from  long-­term  rental  market  (New  York  City  Rent  Regulation  Board,  2014). 
 
4.5. INCENTIVE EXISTS 
 
With  the  assumption  of  67  percent  occupancy  rate  from  the  LAANE’s  study,  I  compare  
the  listing  prices  and  median  asked  rents  from  StreetEasy  since  comparing  listing  prices  
with  median  gross  rents  does  not  reflect  hosts’  present  financial  incentives  (See  
Appenix  B).  In  most  neighborhoods,  it  is  financially  more  lucrative  to  rent  an  apartment  
out  as  Airbnb  units  than  as  a  long-­term  rental.  Homeowners  would  earn  921  dollars  per  
month  per  unit  on  average.  Clinton  Hill,  Brooklyn  was  the  most  profitable  neighborhood,  
earning  an  additional  2,335  dollars  per  month  per  unit,  and  Midtown,  SoHo-­TriBeCa-­
Civic  Center-­Little  Italy,  Upper  East  Side  followed  with  more  than  2,000  additional  
dollars  per  month  per  unit.  For  most  of  New  York  City,  there  are  financial  incentives  for  





5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In  determining  whether  Airbnb  units  affects  the  rental  housing  market  in  New  York  City,  
this  paper  attempts  to  test  the  following  hypotheses:  1)  Airbnb  units  increase  rents  on  
the  long-­term  housing  market,  2)  Airbnb  units  exacerbate  the  rent  burden  of  the  renter  
population,  3)  Airbnb  units  cause  renter  eviction  and  4)  Airbnb  units  deplete  rental  
housing  stocks.  These  hypotheses  were  tested  with  difference-­in-­differences  




This  paper  hopes  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  Airbnb  on  New  York’s  rental  housing  market  
by   looking  at   two  different   groups   in   two  different   times.  There  are   two  neighborhood  
groups  divided  by  treatment  status,  Treat  =  0,1  where  0  indicates  neighborhoods  that  do  
not  receive  treatment,  i.e.  the  control  group,  and  1  indicates  neighborhoods  that  receive  
treatment,   i.e.   the   treatment  group.  Treatment  group   is   the  neighborhoods  with  Airbnb  
units   more   than   1   percent   of   its   rental   housing   stocks   and   control   group   is   the  
neighborhoods   without   any   Airbnb   units.   Treatment   and   control   groups   are   shown   in  






There  are  two  different  time  periods,  Post  =  0,1  where  0  indicates  a  time  period  before  
the  treatment  group  receives  treatment,  i.e.  pre-­treatment,  and  1  indicates  a  time  period  
after  the  treatment  group  receives  treatment,  i.e.  post-­treatment.  Since  Airbnb  was  
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introduced  to  the  market  in  2009,  the  study  looks  at  the  value  before  and  after  2009,  




Difference-­in-­differences  estimation  uses  four  points  to  deduce  the  impact  of  a  
treatment  on  the  treatment  group.  Four  data  points  are  the  averages  of  the  outcome  for  
the  treatment  group  before  and  after  treatment,  the  corresponding  averages  of  the  
outcome  for  the  control  group.  The  outcome  is  modeled  by  the  following  equation. 
 




Based  on  this  equation,  observed  average  of  the  control  group  in  2009  is  a,  which  is  a  
constant  term.  Observed  average  of  the  control  group  in  2014  is  a  +  c.  c  is  time  trend  
common  to  both  control  and  treatment  groups.  Observed  average  of  the  treatment  
group  in  2009  is  a  +  b.  b  is  a  treatment  specific  effect  and  this  is  to  account  for  average  
permanent  difference  between  treatment  and  control  groups.  Observed  average  of  the  




Neighborhood  [Y00]  =  a 
Neighborhood  [Y01]  =  a  +  c 
Neighborhood  [Y10]  =  a  +  b 
Neighborhood  [Y11]  =  a  +  b  +  c  +  d 
  




The  difference-­in-­differences  estimator  is  defined  as  the  difference  in  average  outcome  
in  the  treatment  group  before  and  after  treatment  deducted  by  the  difference  in  average  
outcome  in  the  control  group  before  and  after  treatment.   
 
5.3. PARALLEL TREND ASSUMPTION 
 
Difference-­in-­differences  assumes  parallel  trends  in  the  dependent  variable.  It  assumes  
that  without  treatment,  the  average  change  for  the  treated  would  have  been  equal  to  the  
observed  average  change  for  the  controls.  It  is  often  difficult  and  sometimes  impossible  
to  check  the  assumptions  in  the  model  as  they  are  often  unobservable  quantities.  One  
of  the  most  common  problem  with  difference-­in-­differences  estimates  is  the  failure  of  
parallel  assumption.  This  happens  when  there  is  a  different  trend  for  the  treatment  and  
control  group.  If  the  control  group  has  a  time  trend  of  c,  while  the  treatment  group  has  a  
trend  of  c+Δ,  the  difference-­in-­differences  estimator  will  be  biased  as  d+Δ.  The  failure  of  
the  parallel  trend  assumption  is  a  relatively  common  problem  in  many  studies,  causing  
many  difference-­in-­differences  estimators  to  be  biased.  One  way  to  avoid  these  problem  
is  to  get  more  data  on  other  time  periods  before  treatment  to  see  if  there  are  any  other  
existing  differences  in  trends.  This  paper  examines  existing  differences  in  trends  by  
looking  at  average  values  of  dependent  variables  in  2000.   
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Treatment  group  is  neighborhoods  that  are  with  Airbnb  units  more  than  1  percent  of  
their  total  rental  stocks.  Control  group  is  neighborhoods  that  are  without  any  Airbnb  
units.  Before  treatment  will  be  variables  in  2009  when  Airbnb  was  first  introduced  in  
New  York  City.  After  treatment  will  be  variables  in  2014.  Airbnb  effect  is  an  interaction  
term  of  post  and  treat  dummies.  This  variable  gives  us  the  change  in  dependent  
variables  that  seems  to  be  occurred  due  to  increase  in  Airbnb  units.   
 




Gross  rent  is  the  monthly  amount  of  rent  that  includes  the  estimated  average  monthly  
cost  of  utilities  and  fuel  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  2013).  This  variable  was  taken  into  
consideration  since  it  gives  an  immediate  sense  that  if  the  treatment  has  correlation  with  
rent  increase.  Looking  at  gross  rents  in  two  different  neighborhoods  in  two  different  
times  would  make  it  possible  to  prove  Thomas  Davidoff’s  claim:  Airbnb  rentals  pushes  
up  rent  in  prime  neighborhoods.   
 
RENTINC 
Gross  rent  as  a  percentage  of  income  is  the  ratio  of  gross  rent  to  household  income.  It  
is  used  as  a  measure  of  housing  affordability.  It  is  often  referred  to  as  a  housing  cost  
burden  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  2013).  This  variable  was  considered  since  gross  rent  
variable  alone  does  not  cover  income  status  of  households  in  the  neighborhood.  This  
variable  will  make  it  possible  to  look  at  rent  increase  compared  to  the  household  income  




Rental  occupancy  rate  is  the  proportion  of  the  renter-­occupied  housing  units.  It  is  
computed  by  dividing  the  number  of  renter-­occupied  housing  units  by  the  total  occupied  
housing  units,  and  then  multiplying  by  100  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  2013).  This  variable  
was  considered  to  verify  if  increase  in  number  of  Airbnb  units  in  the  neighborhoods  




Rental  vacancy  rate  is  defined  as  the  proportion  of  the  rental  inventory  that  is  vacant  
and  “for  rent.”  It  is  computed  by  dividing  the  number  of  vacant  units  “for  rent”  by  the  sum  
of  renter-­occupied  units,  vacant  units  “for  rent”,  and  vacant  units  that  have  been  rented  
but  not  yet  occupied,  and  then  multiplying  by  100  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  2013).  This  
variable  was  to  measure  if  short-­term  lodgings  lead  to  decrease  in  rental  vacancy  rate  




Data  regarding  Airbnb  listings  in  New  York  City  was  gathered  from  Inside  Airbnb,  
scraped  on  February  2016  by  technology  professional  Murray  Fox.  Murray  Cox  is  a  
community  activist  based  in  New  York  City  who  utilizes  his  technology  skills  for  various  
nonprofits  and  community  groups.  Webscrapes  extract  and  compile  data  from  the  
public-­facing  websites  and  allow  for  analysis  that  would  otherwise  not  be  able  or  
practical  to  conduct  using  a  standard  browser.  The  database  provides  comprehensive  
collection  of  data  on  short-­term  rental  listings  registered  from  June  2008  to  February  
2016. 
 
Every  Airbnb  listing  locations  was  provided  with  xy  coordinates.  Airbnb  units  were  
counted  by  Neighborhood  Tabulation  Areas  (NTAs)  and  Census  Tracts  by  using  spatial  
join  in  ArcGIS.  Location  points  were  mostly  accurate  but  the  short-­term  lodging  
company  intentionally  added  faulty  points  and  removed  some  of  entire  home/apt  listings  
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in  Manhattan  (Cox  &  Slee,  2016).  Fault  points  were  not  eliminated  in  analyses  and  
instead,  added  in  the  neighborhoods  in  which  they  were  specified  in  street  and  city  
column  in  the  dataset. 
 
I  used  NTA  boundaries  to  choose  control  and  treatment  group,  and  actual  difference-­in-­
differences  were  conducted  in  census  tract  level.  This  is  because  census  tract  
boundaries  had  changed  in  2010.  Neighborhood  Tabulation  Areas,  or  NTAs,  are  
aggregations  of  census  tracts  that  are  subsets  of  New  York  City’s  55  Public  Use  
Microdata  Areas,  or  PUMAs  (New  York  City  Department  of  City  Planning).  By  using  
NTA  boundaries,  it  was  able  to  conduct  regression  capturing  same  geographical  area  
before  and  after  2010.  But  due  to  PUMA  constraints,  NTA  boundaries  and  their  names  
may  not  definitely  represent  traditionally  perceived  neighborhoods.   
 
I  used  secondary  data  for  median  gross  rent,  median  household  income,  total  occupied  
units,  renter  occupied  units,  units  that  are  vacant  for  rent.  It  was  provided  by  U.S.  
Census  Bureau,  2005-­2009  and  2010-­2014  5-­year  American  Community  Survey.  All  
data  are  gathered  and  compiled  in  census  tract  level.  Since  ACS  5-­years  estimates  are  
based  on  data  collected  from  2010  to  2014,  that  covers  most  of  the  time  periods  that  
Airbnb  was  present  in  NYC,  it  has  limitation  to  capture  abrupt  change  in  values  after  the  
Airbnb  treatment.  It  would  have  been  easier  to  capture  change  in  values  with  1-­year  or  
3-­years  estimates.  However,  the  unit  of  analysis  of  the  study  was  the  census  tract  level,  






6.1. MEDIAN GROSS RENT 
 





Median  gross  rent  in  control  group  in  2009  was  1,085.54  dollars  and  it  increased  79.04  
dollars  by  2014.  This  implies  that  all  neighborhood  groups  regardless  of  Airbnb  
treatment  faced  rent  increase  by  about  79  dollars  during  five  years  of  time.  The  initial  
difference  in  median  gross  rents  between  control  and  treatment  neighborhood  was  
317.23  dollars  in  2009.  This  assumes  that  rents  in  neighborhood  with  Airbnb  units  tend  
to  be  317.23  dollars  more  expensive  constantly  over  time.  In  2014,  the  difference  in  
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median  gross  rents  between  two  groups  was  394.27  dollars,  which  exceeds  77.04  
dollars  more  and  this  is  regarded  as  rent  increase  from  Airbnb  effect.   
 
The  Difference-­in-­Difference  regression  shows  77.04  dollars  increase  in  median  gross  
rents  within  5  years  in  treatment  neighborhoods  where  more  than  1  percent  of  their  
rental  stock  used  as  Airbnb  units.  However,  according  to  the  t-­test  result,  increase  in  
median  gross  rent  from  the  treatment  is  small  and  insignificant.  It  is  rather  hard  to  
conclude  that  Airbnb  clustered  neighborhoods  experience  more  rent  increase  compared  
to  that  of  neighborhoods  without  any  Airbnb  units.  It  is  hard  to  accept  the  statement  that  
claims  Airbnb  units  increase  rents.  The  regression  showed  that  a  losing  1  percent  of  
rental  housing  stock  from  a  neighborhood  level  rarely  cause  significant  increase  in  
rents.    
 
6.2. RENT IN PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 







Rent  in  percentage  of  household  income  in  control  group  was  35.54  percent  in  2009.  It  
increased  by  2.14  percentage  point  in  2014.  This  implies  that  households  in  all  
neighborhood  groups  regardless  of  Airbnb  treatment  resulted  in  spending  2.14  percent  
more  of  their  income  on  rents  than  before.  In  2009,  Airbnb-­clustered  neighborhoods  
tend  to  spend  7.45  percentage  point  less  on  housing  compared  to  neighborhoods  
without  Airbnb  units.  This  tells  us  that  households  in  treatment  neighborhoods  tend  to  
spend  less  portion  of  their  income  on  rents  constantly  over  time.  Considering  that  
households  in  treatment  neighborhood  pay  about  317  dollars  more  than  those  in  control  
group,  renter  households  in  treated  neighborhoods  seem  to  have  higher  income  than  
renters  in  controlled  neighborhoods.  Regression  result  shows  that  in  2014,  the  
difference  between  two  groups  was  about  -­9.37  percentage  point  and  additional  -­1.92  
percentage  point  difference  is  stemmed  from  1  percent  of  rental  housing  stock  used  as  
Airbnb  units.  
 
The  Difference-­in-­Differences  regression  displays  that  households  in  treatment  
neighborhood  spent  1.92  percentage  point  less  of  their  income  on  housing  in  2014.  The  
alleviation  in  rental  cost  was  statistically  significant  with  99  percent  confidence  level.  
With  this  result,  it  is  hard  to  prove  the  claim  that  Airbnb  units  exacerbate  rent  burden  on  
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renter  population.  However,  this  can  be  also  interpreted  as  renter  households’  having  
additional  income  source  through  renting  their  unit  out  to  home-­sharing  platforms  and  
alleviate  their  rental  cost.    
  
From  2000  to  2009,  rent  in  percentage  of  household  income  in  treated  and  controlled  
neighborhood  showed  different  trends.  Before  2009,  rent  burden  on  households  in  
controlled  group  deteriorated  faster  than  those  in  treated  group.  However,  after  2009,  
after  Airbnb  treatment,  the  trend  between  two  groups  became  relatively  parallel.    
 
6.3. RENTER OCCUPANCY RATE 
 







Renter  occupancy  rate  in  control  group  was  68.86  percent  in  2009.  It  decreased  by  0.06  
percentage  point  in  2014.  This  year  effect  explains  0.06  percentage  point  change  within  
5  years  in  renter  occupancy  rate  in  all  neighborhood  groups.  The  initial  difference  in  
renter  occupancy  rate  between  control  and  treatment  neighborhood  was  6.44  percent,  
that  is  to  say,  renter  occupancy  rate  in  treated  neighborhood  was  75.29  percent  in  2009.  
This  neighborhood  effect  describes  that  renter  occupancy  rate  in  neighborhood  with  
Airbnb  units  have  tendency  to  have  more  share  of  renter  population  continually  over  
time  by  6.44  percentage  point.  In  2014,  the  difference  in  renter  occupancy  rate  between  
two  groups  was  6.06  percentage  point,  and  that  fell  0.37  percentage  point  short  of  
expected  renter  occupancy  rate.  This  amount  is  considered  to  be  correlated  with  Airbnb  
units  comprising  more  than  1  percent  of  neighborhoods’  rental  housing  stock.  
 
The  Difference-­in-­Differences  regression  suggest  that  Airbnb  cause  0.37  percentage  
point  decrease  in  the  share  of  renter  household  within  5  years  in  treated  neighborhoods.  
In  other  words,  1  percent  of  rental  supply  contracts  force  out  renter  households  by  0.37  
percent.  T-­test  reports  that  decrease  in  renter  occupancy  rate  is  negligible  and  
insignificant.  This  result  refutes  the  claim  that  increase  in  Airbnb  units  accelerate  renter  




Parallel  trends  from  2000  to  2009  shows  that  renter  occupancy  rate  decreased  faster  in  
treated  neighborhood.  That  is  to  say,  until  2009,  owner  occupant  housing  units  were  
growing  in  treated  neighborhood.  However,  after  2009,  the  trend  between  two  groups  
became  relatively  parallel.    
 
6.4. RENTAL VACANCY RATE 
 







Rental  vacancy  rate  in  controlled  neighborhood  was  4.46  percent  in  2009.  It  decreased  
by  2.47  percentage  point,  to  1.99  percent  within  5  years.  This  year  effect  suggests  that  
regardless  of  Airbnb  units  presenting  in  rental  housing  stocks,  both  controlled  and  
treated  neighborhood  groups  were  assumed  to  undergo  shrinkage  in  rental  vacancy  
rate.  The  gap  between  two  neighborhood  groups  was  -­0.67  percentage  point  in  2009.  
This  explains  that  rental  vacancy  rate  in  treated  neighborhood  was  3.8  percent  in  2009.  
Rental  vacancy  rate  in  the  neighborhood  where  1  percent  of  rental  inventory  is  taken  
over  by  Airbnb  rentals  tend  to  have  lower  rental  vacancy  rate  by  0.67  percent.  In  2014,  
the  difference  in  rental  vacancy  rate  between  two  groups  was  1.9  percentage  point,  that  
outpaced  point  expected  rental  vacancy  rate  by  2.57  percentage  point.  This  difference  
is  considered  to  be  derived  from  Airbnb  units  comprising  more  than  1  percent  of  
neighborhoods’  rental  housing  inventory.  
 
The  Difference-­in-­Differences  regression  suggest  that  Airbnb  cause  2.57  percentage  
point  increase  in  rental  vacancy  rate  within  5  years  in  treated  neighborhoods.  That  is,  1  
percent  of  rental  supply  contractions  creates  more  vacant  units  by  2.57  percentage  
point.  According  to  T-­test,  this  result  is  statistically  significant.  This  may  sound  
counterintuitive  to  most  people  who  support  anti-­Airbnb  arguments  who  thought  





7. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
  
Difference-­in-­differences  analysis  showed  a  lack  of  correlation  between  increases  in  the  
number  of    Airbnb  units  and  increases  in  rent.  Even  though  rents  did  not  surge  in  the  
treated  neighborhoods,  rent  as  in  percentage  of  household  income  shrunk  by  about  2  
percent.  This  indicates  that  renter  households’  income  after  housing  cost  increased  in  
treated  neighborhoods.  This  shows  that  Airbnb’s  presence  has  not  influenced  the  
affordability  of  rental  housing  in  New  York  City.  It  is  either  household  income  in  the  
treated  neighborhoods  increased  more  then  rent  did,  or  Airbnb-­generated  income  might  
have  played  a  bigger  role  in  these  neighborhoods.  The  share  of  renter  population  
slightly  decreased  in  Airbnb-­popular  neighborhoods  but  it  was  hard  to  find  strong  
evidence  of  renter  evictions  in  those  neighborhoods.  In  the  5  years  Airbnb  has  operated  
in  New  York,  the  rental  vacancy  rate  has  increased  by  2.57  percent.  This  suggest  that  
neighborhoods  with  Airbnb  units  tend  to  have  more  vacant  units  for  rent.  The  increase  
in  vacancy  rate  does  not  support  the  argument  that  home-­sharing  platforms  make  the  
rental  housing  market  tighter.  
  
Initially,  I  looked  at  the  rental  vacancy  rate  to  see  if  Airbnb  is  making  therental  housing  
market  tighter  by  removing  rental  units  from  the  market.  However,  based  on  my  initial  
the  results,  I  could  see  that  it  is  not  possible  to  measure  the  tightness  of  the  rental  
housing  market  using  the  conventional  rental  vacancy  rate  method.  It  was  perplexing  to  
find  the  rental  vacancy  rate  in  the  most  desirable  neighborhoods  to  be  above  the  city  
wide  average  rental  vacancy  rate.  One  explanation  is  that  landowners  are  habitually  
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answering  “vacant  for  rent”  on  the  surveys  while  making  their  properties  permanently  
available  on  Airbnb  or  other  home  sharing  platforms.  
  
It  is  still  uncertain  how  vacant  units  that  are  rented  out  as  short-­term  rentals  are  
classified  by  the  US  Census  Bureau.  ACS  5-­Year  Estimates  divide  vacancy  status  into  
several  categories:  vacant  for  rent;;  rented  but  not  occupied;;  for  sale;;  sold  but  not  
occupied;;  for  seasonal,  recreational,  or  occasional  use;;  and  other  vacant.  In  treated  
neighborhoods,  the  share  of  units  categorized  as  vacant  for  rent  increased  significantly.  
It  is  possible  that  this  class  contains  many  Airbnb  units.  Owners  may  be  creating  
permanently  vacant  rental  units  by  classifying  them  as  vacant  for  rent  becuase  ACS  
does  not  provide  a  clear  categorization  for  short-­term  rental  units.  
  
Even  though  difference-­in-­differences  analysis  suggests  Airbnb  is  not  disrupting  New  
York  City’s  rental  housing  market,  Airbnb  should  be  monitored.  Airbnb  has  only  
operated  in  New  York  City  since  2009,  and  already  taking  up  0.5  percent  of  its  rental  
housing  stock.  It  is  possible  that  the  critical  mass  needed  to  effect  the  rental  housing  
market  has  not  be  yet  been  reached.  Moreover,  the  time  in  which  Airbnb  was  introduced  
was  amid  the  chaos  following  the  economic  panic  caused  by  the  subprime  mortgage  
crisis  of  2008.  This  intervention  to  the  rental  housing  market  might  be  strongly  reflected  
in  the  analysis  results.  The  financial  incentives  persist  for  people  to  take  units  off  of  the  
rental  market,  and  the  number  is  growing,  especially  in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn.  If  more  
units  are  added  to  those  neighborhoods  in  long  term,  the  same  analysis  may  be  
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APPENDIX A – Airbnb units in Rental Stock 
NTACode   NTAName   COUNT   RENTAL  STOCK   PERCENT  
BK93   Starrett  City   0   6230   0  
BX06   Belmont   0   8631   0  
BX08   West  Farms-­Bronx  River   0   10560   0  
BX27   Hunts  Point   0   8361   0  
BX30   Kingsbridge  Heights   0   9374   0  
BX36   University  Heights-­Morris  Heights   0   18175   0  
BX40   Fordham  South   0   8505   0  
BX55   Soundview-­Bruckner   0   9667   0  
BX62   Woodlawn-­Wakefield   0   8650   0  
BX75   Crotona  Park  East   0   6693   0  
QN07   Hollis   0   2770   0  
QN19   Glendale   0   6420   0  
QN44   Glen  Oaks-­Floral  Park-­New  Hyde  Park   0   2072   0  
QN45   Douglas  Manor-­Douglaston-­Little  Neck   0   2315   0  
QN48   Auburndale   0   2328   0  
SI32   Rossville-­Woodrow   0   1584   0  
SI48   Arden  Heights   0   1067   0  
BX01   Claremont-­Bathgate   1   10110   0  
BX35   Morrisania-­Melrose   1   12374   0  
QN61   Jamaica   1   12389   0  
BX26   Highbridge   1   12586   0  
QN25   Corona   1   13260   0  
BX17   East  Tremont   1   13822   0  
QN51   Murray  Hill   1   9819   0.0001  
BX41   Mount  Hope   2   16840   0.00012  
BX03   Eastchester-­Edenwald-­Baychester   1   7492   0.00013  
QN01   South  Jamaica   1   7062   0.00014  
BX59   Westchester-­Unionport   1   6795   0.00015  
BK88   Borough  Park   3   20011   0.00015  
BX05   Bedford  Park-­Fordham  North   3   18198   0.00016  
BX14   East  Concourse-­Concourse  Village   4   20222   0.0002  
BX28   Van  Cortlandt  Village   3   15046   0.0002  
BX46   Parkchester   2   9893   0.0002  
BK29   Bensonhurst  East   3   14497   0.00021  
BK45   Georgetown-­Marine  Park-­Bergen  Beach-­Mill  Basin   1   4731   0.00021  
QN53   Woodhaven   2   8686   0.00023  
BK30   Dyker  Heights   2   8290   0.00024  
BX33   Longwood   2   8176   0.00024  
BX07   Bronxdale   3   12200   0.00025  
	  	  
44  
NTACode   NTAName   COUNT   RENTAL  STOCK   PERCENT  
BX13   Co-­op  City   3   11482   0.00026  
QN22   Flushing   5   18992   0.00026  
BK26   Gravesend   2   7521   0.00027  
BX37   Van  Nest-­Morris  Park-­Westchester  Square   2   7231   0.00028  
QN26   North  Corona   3   10300   0.00029  
QN02   Springfield  Gardens  North   2   6775   0.0003  
BK27   Bath  Beach   2   6753   0.0003  
QN49   Whitestone   1   3331   0.0003  
QN15   Far  Rockaway-­Bayswater   4   12482   0.00032  
QN42   Oakland  Gardens   1   3096   0.00032  
SI54   Great  Kills   1   3020   0.00033  
BX52   Schuylerville-­Throgs  Neck-­Edgewater  Park   3   8780   0.00034  
QN55   South  Ozone  Park   3   8334   0.00036  
BX09   Soundview-­Castle  Hill-­Clason  Point-­Harding  Park   5   13851   0.00036  
BK44   Madison   3   8231   0.00036  
BK81   Brownsville   7   18589   0.00038  
SI24   Todt  Hill-­Emerson  Hill-­Heartland  Village-­Lighthouse  Hill   1   2471   0.0004  
SI07   Westerleigh   1   2461   0.00041  
QN29   Elmhurst   9   21208   0.00042  
SI08   Grymes  Hill-­Clifton-­Fox  Hills   2   4693   0.00043  
QN43   Bellerose   1   2328   0.00043  
BK23   West  Brighton   2   4490   0.00045  
QN35   Briarwood-­Jamaica  Hills   4   8844   0.00045  
BX49   Pelham  Parkway   4   8781   0.00046  
SI01   Annadale-­Huguenot-­Prince's  Bay-­Eltingville   1   2194   0.00046  
BX29   Spuyten  Duyvil-­Kingsbridge   4   8747   0.00046  
BX34   Melrose  South-­Mott  Haven  North   6   13054   0.00046  
BX43   Norwood   5   10672   0.00047  
QN23   College  Point   2   4245   0.00047  
BX63   West  Concourse   6   12727   0.00047  
BK82   East  New  York   13   26390   0.00049  
BK46   Ocean  Parkway  South   2   3944   0.00051  
QN41   Fresh  Meadows-­Utopia   2   3725   0.00054  
QN46   Bayside-­Bayside  Hills   3   5558   0.00054  
BK43   Midwood   7   12848   0.00054  
BK28   Bensonhurst  West   11   20159   0.00055  
QN38   Pomonok-­Flushing  Heights-­Hillcrest   4   6752   0.00059  
QN54   Richmond  Hill   6   9888   0.00061  
SI11   Charleston-­Richmond  Valley-­Tottenville   1   1608   0.00062  
BX39   Mott  Haven-­Port  Morris   11   17497   0.00063  
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NTACode   NTAName   COUNT   RENTAL  STOCK   PERCENT  
BX44   Williamsbridge-­Olinville   10   15596   0.00064  
QN47   Ft.  Totten-­Bay  Terrace-­Clearview   2   3039   0.00066  
QN06   Jamaica  Estates-­Holliswood   3   4444   0.00068  
BK25   Homecrest   7   9892   0.00071  
BX22   North  Riverdale-­Fieldston-­Riverdale   4   5591   0.00072  
BK21   Seagate-­Coney  Island   7   9708   0.00072  
QN57   Lindenwood-­Howard  Beach   2   2750   0.00073  
QN62   Queensboro  Hill   2   2746   0.00073  
QN60   Kew  Gardens   5   6729   0.00074  
QN37   Kew  Gardens  Hills   5   6545   0.00076  
SI05   New  Springville-­Bloomfield-­Travis   3   3911   0.00077  
SI25   Oakwood-­Oakwood  Beach   2   2534   0.00079  
SI28   Port  Richmond   2   2445   0.00082  
BK96   Rugby-­Remsen  Village   12   14644   0.00082  
BK34   Sunset  Park  East   14   16698   0.00084  
QN52   East  Flushing   4   4687   0.00085  
QN33   Cambria  Heights   1   1134   0.00088  
SI12   Mariner's  Harbor-­Arlington-­Port  Ivory-­Graniteville   4   4495   0.00089  
QN10   Breezy  Point-­Belle  Harbor-­Rockaway  Park-­Broad  Channel   4   4490   0.00089  
BK41   Kensington-­Ocean  Parkway   8   8890   0.0009  
QN34   Queens  Village   5   5472   0.00091  
BK83   Cypress  Hills-­City  Line   10   10256   0.00098  
BX10   Pelham  Bay-­Country  Club-­City  Island   7   6923   0.00101  
QN03   Springfield  Gardens  South-­Brookville   2   1966   0.00102  
BK19   Brighton  Beach   11   10383   0.00106  
QN30   Maspeth   6   5326   0.00113  
SI37   Stapleton-­Rosebank   6   5144   0.00117  
SI35   New  Brighton-­Silver  Lake   3   2566   0.00117  
BX31   Allerton-­Pelham  Gardens   5   4215   0.00119  
BK58   Flatlands   12   10027   0.0012  
QN50   Elmhurst-­Maspeth   6   5004   0.0012  
MN01   Marble  Hill-­Inwood   21   17155   0.00122  
QN56   Ozone  Park   4   3132   0.00128  
QN27   East  Elmhurst   5   3902   0.00128  
BK85   East  New  York  (Pennsylvania  Ave)   11   8432   0.0013  
BK32   Sunset  Park  West   18   13384   0.00134  
BK31   Bay  Ridge   32   23556   0.00136  
BK17   Sheepshead  Bay-­Gerritsen  Beach-­Manhattan  Beach   18   13002   0.00138  
QN63   Woodside   16   11445   0.0014  
QN21   Middle  Village   9   6384   0.00141  
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QN18   Rego  Park   11   7713   0.00143  
QN28   Jackson  Heights   35   24483   0.00143  
QN17   Forest  Hills   31   21398   0.00145  
BK50   Canarsie   22   14849   0.00148  
SI36   Old  Town-­Dongan  Hills-­South  Beach   5   3163   0.00158  
QN08   St.  Albans   8   4758   0.00168  
BK91   East  Flatbush-­Farragut   17   9812   0.00173  
QN05   Rosedale   5   2881   0.00174  
BK72   Williamsburg   13   7244   0.00179  
QN66   Laurelton   3   1648   0.00182  
MN36   Washington  Heights  South   54   27505   0.00196  
SI22   West  New  Brighton-­New  Brighton-­St.  George   18   7957   0.00226  
QN12   Hammels-­Arverne-­Edgemere   22   9055   0.00243  
SI45   New  Dorp-­Midland  Beach   5   2057   0.00243  
QN76   Baisley  Park   10   4084   0.00245  
SI14   Grasmere-­Arrochar-­Ft.  Wadsworth   6   2434   0.00247  
QN71   Old  Astoria   25   10051   0.00249  
BK42   Flatbush   88   32211   0.00273  
QN20   Ridgewood   55   19668   0.0028  
BK95   Erasmus   25   8381   0.00298  
MN35   Washington  Heights  North   70   22757   0.00308  
MN50   Stuyvesant  Town-­Cooper  Village   33   10636   0.0031  
QN68   Queensbridge-­Ravenswood-­Long  Island  City   24   7026   0.00342  
BK79   Ocean  Hill   37   10343   0.00358  
MN06   Manhattanville   29   8089   0.00359  
BK63   Crown  Heights  South   53   13079   0.00405  
QN70   Astoria   125   30108   0.00415  
QN72   Steinway   61   14573   0.00419  
QN31   Hunters  Point-­Sunnyside-­West  Maspeth   96   22666   0.00424  
MN33   East  Harlem  South   110   22178   0.00496  
MN09   Morningside  Heights   87   16986   0.00512  
BK60   Prospect  Lefferts  Gardens-­Wingate   120   22639   0.0053  
MN34   East  Harlem  North   131   22376   0.00585  
BK77   Bushwick  North   113   18168   0.00622  
MN03   Central  Harlem  North-­Polo  Grounds   198   31662   0.00625  
MN31   Lenox  Hill-­Roosevelt  Island   224   34102   0.00657  
MN32   Yorkville   231   34494   0.0067  
BK40   Windsor  Terrace   39   5718   0.00682  
MN12   Upper  West  Side   340   49020   0.00694  
BK09   Brooklyn  Heights-­Cobble  Hill   47   6212   0.00757  
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MN04   Hamilton  Heights   130   17041   0.00763  
BK78   Bushwick  South   177   22757   0.00778  
BK61   Crown  Heights  North   298   37476   0.00795  
MN14   Lincoln  Square   172   20318   0.00847  
MN25   Battery  Park  City-­Lower  Manhattan   155   18191   0.00852  
MN11   Central  Harlem  South   143   16503   0.00867  
BK33   Carroll  Gardens-­Columbia  Street-­Red  Hook   119   13435   0.00886  
MN40   Upper  East  Side-­Carnegie  Hill   117   12617   0.00927  
BK75   Bedford   202   21173   0.00954  
MN19   Turtle  Bay-­East  Midtown   174   17682   0.00984  
MN28   Lower  East  Side   269   26710   0.01007  
BK38   DUMBO-­Vinegar  Hill-­Downtown  Brooklyn-­Boerum  Hill   132   12211   0.01081  
BK35   Stuyvesant  Heights   259   20435   0.01267  
MN20   Murray  Hill-­Kips  Bay   246   18993   0.01295  
BK37   Park  Slope-­Gowanus   258   19514   0.01322  
BK68   Fort  Greene   130   9389   0.01385  
BK90   East  Williamsburg   189   13144   0.01438  
MN21   Gramercy   168   10171   0.01652  
BK64   Prospect  Heights   112   6673   0.01678  
BK76   Greenpoint   221   12817   0.01724  
MN13   Hudson  Yards-­Chelsea-­Flatiron-­Union  Square   538   30635   0.01756  
MN27   Chinatown   321   17371   0.01848  
BK69   Clinton  Hill   217   10810   0.02007  
MN17   Midtown-­Midtown  South   292   13336   0.0219  
MN15   Clinton   503   22439   0.02242  
MN23   West  Village   632   26258   0.02407  
MN22   East  Village   526   20445   0.02573  
MN24   SoHo-­TriBeCa-­Civic  Center-­Little  Italy   414   14430   0.02869  
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RENT   INCENTIVE  
BK69   Clinton  Hill   7291.21   4885.11   2550   2335.11  
MN17   Midtown-­Midtown  South   8869.33   5942.45   3695   2247.45  
MN24   SoHo-­TriBeCa-­Civic  Center-­Little  Italy   9196.49   6161.65   4038   2124.15  
MN40   Upper  East  Side-­Carnegie  Hill   7393.61   4953.72   2870   2083.72  
QN31   Hunters  Point-­Sunnyside-­West  Maspeth   5398.60   3617.06   1650   1967.06  
QN68   Queensbridge-­Ravenswood-­Long  Island  City   5769.63   3865.65   2100   1765.65  
BK33   Carroll  Gardens-­Columbia  Street-­Red  Hook   6554.34   4391.41   2750   1641.41  
MN09   Morningside  Heights   5268.56   3529.94   2000   1529.94  
MN27   Chinatown   6021.40   4034.34   2570   1464.34  
MN33   East  Harlem  South   5285.77   3541.47   2095   1446.47  
MN28   Lower  East  Side   5804.80   3889.22   2570   1319.22  
MN14   Lincoln  Square   7384.38   4947.53   3635   1312.53  
MN19   Turtle  Bay-­East  Midtown   7135.61   4780.86   3480   1300.86  
BK37   Park  Slope-­Gowanus   5569.20   3731.37   2450   1281.37  
BK79   Ocean  Hill   4134.86   2770.36   1550   1220.36  
MN23   West  Village   7920.95   5307.04   4090   1217.04  
BX63   West  Concourse   3585.00   2401.95   1200   1201.95  
BX35   Morrisania-­Melrose   3600.00   2412.00   1230   1182.00  
BX39   Mott  Haven-­Port  Morris   3645.45   2442.45   1265   1177.45  
MN11   Central  Harlem  South   4859.83   3256.09   2085   1171.09  
MN20   Murray  Hill-­Kips  Bay   6869.14   4602.32   3435   1167.32  
BK91   East  Flatbush-­Farragut   3796.00   2543.32   1395   1148.32  
MN22   East  Village   6022.81   4035.28   2895   1140.28  
MN15   Clinton   6815.43   4566.34   3430   1136.34  
MN13   Hudson  Yards-­Chelsea-­Flatiron-­Union  Square   7581.99   5079.93   3950   1129.93  
MN04   Hamilton  Heights   4609.21   3088.17   2000   1088.17  
BK32   Sunset  Park  West   4044.44   2709.78   1650   1059.78  
BX34   Melrose  South-­Mott  Haven  North   3440.00   2304.80   1290   1014.80  
BK77   Bushwick  North   4833.28   3238.30   2270   968.30  
MN36   Washington  Heights  South   4090.93   2740.92   1785   955.92  
BX26   Highbridge   3200.00   2144.00   1250   894.00  
BK50   Canarsie   3800.91   2546.61   1680   866.61  
BK76   Greenpoint   5163.46   3459.52   2600   859.52  
MN34   East  Harlem  North   4314.57   2890.76   2095   795.76  
BK09   Brooklyn  Heights-­Cobble  Hill   5498.13   3683.75   2925   758.75  
BK58   Flatlands   3430.00   2298.10   1550   748.10  
MN21   Gramercy   7232.67   4845.89   4100   745.89  
MN25   Battery  Park  City-­Lower  Manhattan   6966.52   4667.57   3933   735.07  
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MN32   Yorkville   5334.34   3574.01   2870   704.01  
BK61   Crown  Heights  North   4138.24   2772.62   2095   677.62  
MN03   Central  Harlem  North-­Polo  Grounds   4101.69   2748.13   2085   663.13  
BK42   Flatbush   3448.89   2310.75   1650   660.75  
MN31   Lenox  Hill-­Roosevelt  Island   5269.25   3530.39   2870   660.39  
MN06   Manhattanville   3968.90   2659.16   2000   659.16  
BK64   Prospect  Heights   4672.66   3130.68   2500   630.68  
QN70   Astoria   4050.43   2713.79   2100   613.79  
BK41   Kensington-­Ocean  Parkway   3574.00   2394.58   1785   609.58  
BK73   North  Side-­South  Side   5830.31   3906.31   3300   606.31  
MN01   Marble  Hill-­Inwood   3539.52   2371.48   1785   586.48  
MN12   Upper  West  Side   6151.44   4121.47   3635   486.47  
BK78   Bushwick  South   4078.19   2732.38   2270   462.38  
BX33   Longwood   2525.00   1691.75   1230   461.75  
BK68   Fort  Greene   4850.23   3249.65   2825   424.65  
MN35   Washington  Heights  North   3265.36   2187.79   1785   402.79  
BK38  
DUMBO-­Vinegar  Hill-­Downtown  Brooklyn-­Boerum  
Hill   5650.91   3786.11   3441   344.86  
QN71   Old  Astoria   3510.00   2351.70   2100   251.70  
BK88   Borough  Park   3266.67   2188.67   1990   198.67  
BX14   East  Concourse-­Concourse  Village   2562.50   1716.88   1580   136.88  
BK72   Williamsburg   5010.77   3357.22   3300   57.22  
BK40   Windsor  Terrace   3865.59   2589.95   2570   19.95  
BK81   Brownsville   2207.14   1478.79   1490   -­11.21  
BK63   Crown  Heights  South   3024.72   2026.56   2095   -­68.44  
MN50   Stuyvesant  Town-­Cooper  Village   5569.36   3731.47   4100   -­368.53  
 
